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RED HERRINGS RETURN TO ROOST

by Felix Morley

A chain reaction operates in the journalistic estimation of news value. The belated arrest in London of Dr. Klaus Fuchs, on charges of atomic espionage, did not of itself warrant the explosion of press and radio publicity that erupted over here. In the English newspapers, a less excited editorial judgment played the incident down.

It was much the same last September, when President Truman announced portentously that a trial atomic bomb had been exploded in Soviet Russia. I happened to be in London at the time and the universal reaction was "Why not?" In Western Europe all well-informed people have long been aware of the subtlety of the Russian spy system, and of the skill with which Communists are infiltrated into governmental posts where they can be most useful to the Soviet Fatherland. It is different here, where this infiltration has gone very deep.

One of the charges against Dr. Fuchs is that in this country five years ago -- in February, 1945 -- he transmitted atomic research information "useful to an enemy". That news is certainly not surprising.

An English Communist colleague of Dr. Fuchs, the physicist Allan Nunn May, was caught that same year in the Canadian atomic espionage disclosures, and is now serving a ten-year jail sentence. The report of the special Canadian Royal Commission then pointed out that there were many connections between the Canadian spy ring, revealed by cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko, and the larger ring operating in the United States. All the Canadian information was made available to our government by the personal orders of Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The subject was discussed when Mr. King came to Washington in November, 1945, to consider atomic energy problems with President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee.

So the mystery in the Fuchs case is not how secret atomic information could have been passed on to the ubiquitous Soviet agents. The detailed Canadian revelations long since disclosed the manner in which this business was handled, in this country as well as in the less important Canadian cases.

The mystery is why it has taken years for the Truman Administration to make even a tentative start on disclosures that the alert Canadians

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cleaned up at their end in a few months. And the unresolved question is why our responsible officials failed to follow the Canadian leads.

Evidence justifying the arrest of Dr. Fuchs has been available for exactly five years. But the FBI was not allowed to investigate atomic espionage until 1947 and is said to have been working on the Fuchs case for less than a year.

Why, and by whom, was the FBI blocked off from this and similar cases? That is the unrevealed story behind the story, justifying the headlines appropriate to a mystery affecting the safety of us all.

II

We know now that the Soviet spy ring in Canada was operating full blast, and very successfully, at least as early as June, 1943. There is very good reason to suspect that an even larger and more efficient "apparatus" was then well established in the United States. Certainly the "unknown person" to whom Dr. Fuchs is accused of passing top-secret data in February, 1945, was no casual stranger.

All Americans familiar with Communist techniques were at that time aware of the general outline of what was going on. But it was impossible to make the truth prevail over the strong pro-Soviet attitude of the Roosevelt Administration. Indeed any attempt to do so, on the basis of definite evidence, was immediately countered as "isolationist", or even as "pro-Nazi". HUMAN EVENTS was greatly daring when it ventured to say, on March 8, 1944, that: "The Administration seems to be the prisoner of the Communist Party."

And it was not merely the Administration. Mr. Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President in 1940, made a hurried trip to Russia in the summer of 1942 and on his return told all, in a slap-happy compilation entitled <u>One World</u>. In this he advised Americans (p. 86) not to be mistrustful of Communists. "Russia is neither going to eat us nor seduce us. . . . No, we do not need to fear Russia."

About a year later, Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State until his split with Mr. Roosevelt in 1943, wrote <u>The Time for Decision</u>, appropriately chosen as the "Book-of-the-Month" for July, 1944. It stood up for just about that length of time.

This book was in some respects critical of Mr. Roosevelt's leadership. But not where the President's faith in Soviet Russia was concerned. To call Stalin's Russia a dictatorship, said Mr. Welles (p. 309) is only "superficially true". Actually: "The Russian people today are satisfied that their government is devoted to the popular interest. . . . the Soviet government today is guided by the popular will . . .

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Certainly in the immediate future the foreign policy of the Soviet government will continue to represent what the people want." It would be pleasant if we could say as much for the United States!

These samples of the stuff Americans were fed go far to explain why honest efforts to unmask Soviet espionage during its most active period were unavailing. Yet the attempt was conscientiously made, for instance by a small group of Congressmen headed by Representative Busbey of Illinois, shortly before the election of 1944. To this President Roosevelt, in a speech on October 5, replied:

> "It is a source of regret to all decent Americans that some political propagandists are now dragging red herrings across the trail of this national election."

III

This "red herring" phrase, like much else in the Roosevelt bag of tricks, was used more lately, and less successfully, by President Truman. The revelations before the House Un-American Activities Committee which led to the indictment of Alger Hiss were also called a "red herring" -- to keep the public from considering the "bad record" of the 80th Congress. Now that Mr. Hiss has been found guilty it is no longer possible to write off the effort to expose Communist infiltration as "political propaganda". But it would not have become an issue, even in an election year, except for the strange behavior of Secretary Acheson, and perhaps not then except for the even more strangely retarded development of the Fuchs case.

Americans are a generous as well as a politically unsophisticated people. Throughout the country there has been much sympathy for Alger Hiss, wholly aside from the realization that a verdict in the court of first instance is subject to appeal.

Many were therefore willing to reserve their final personal judgment on Alger Hiss, and additionally were anxious to see the case kept out of politics. Come what may, this former high official of the State Department is now a broken man; his career is ruined and his fall is harder because his earlier pretensions were so great. The general desire, as one could see in editorials and private conversation, was to forget the whole miserable business.

And then Dean Acheson, with that strange ineptitude which so often afflicts clever men, suddenly made it impossible to drop this case. The Secretary of State, speaking in that capacity at an official press conference, made prepared remarks which -- however guarded -- could only be interpreted as an aspersion on the judicial process. Coming from a Cabinet officer, after the verdict, Secretary Acheson's defense of Hiss

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was actually executive infringement on the independence of the judiciary, and was promptly resented as such.

Before the echoes of this blunder had subsided -- while the legislatures of Southern states were still voting resolutions demanding the resignation of Secretary Acheson -- came the arrest of Dr. Fuchs in London. And thus was set off the chain reaction referred to at the outset of this analysis. This is big news primarily because of the growing realization that all these ugly disclosures fit together, and are part of a pattern of which much -- perhaps by far the greater part -- is still to be disclosed.

IV

The significance of the case of Alger Hiss might well have been forgotten. Now it will not be.

Simple people who have not given the matter much thought heretofore will now realize more fully that Hiss was convicted, in effect, of passing confidential State papers of the highest importance to active Communist agents. It will be recalled that he was subsequently at the center of activities which in the upshot have proved extremely helpful to Soviet Russia; extremely detrimental to the United States. Mr. Hiss gets much credit for the Yalta Agreement, which led directly and swiftly to the Communist conquest of China. He also gets much credit for securing approval of the Charter of the United Nations in a form that has made it easy for Russia to use that organization as a base for continued espionage, while insuring its worthlessness as an agency for the maintenance of peace.

There was at first no widespread suspicion over the alacrity with which high officials of the Administration rushed to the defense of Alger Hiss. There is such suspicion now. And it is strengthened because there is as yet no explanation of why it has taken over four years to open up the case of Dr. Fuchs. A lot of pieces in the jigsaw puzzle are still missing. Some of them seem to have been carefully swept under the carpet. But enough are being belatedly fitted together to give the pattern a certain shape. It is not a pleasant shape.

If a nation cannot clean its house of corruption, not even hydrogen bombs will give it security -- the less so if the formulae have already been handed to the Kremlin. And that is why Communist infiltration is bound to become a political issue of the first magnitude -- this year -- in spite of popular reluctance to have it so.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 6

By Frank C. Hanighen February 8, 1950

TRUMAN: The mood of President Truman has sharply changed in the last few weeks -- according to officials who have had the privilege of talking with him. Some weeks ago, they recall, Mr. Truman was self-complacent, light-hearted, optimistic, "cocky". Now, he appears unsure of himself; cares are visibly weighing on him; and he seems at times to be tacitly appealing for assistance and sympathy from his callers. The latter is a frame of mind which hasn't been noted since those dark days before his election. This change in the President, of course, obviously springs from the series of defeats in foreign policy, and especially from the developing problem of the hydrogen bomb.

The appearance of such grave concern in the President is accompanied by other revealing symptoms. He is wont now to dwell defensively, in a sort of "oh-you-can't-understand" manner, on his foreign policy. He likes to stress that "outsiders" could not possibly know all the factors that went into this or that decision; and that it might be another generation before such decisions finally appear justified. Increasing sensitivity to criticism, from the Hill and in the press, is another symptom. The word "responsibilities" occurs often in his talk, and one gets the feeling that he thinks the opposition and the press should "share" his "responsibilities". Finally, visitors report that those around the President have been using the term "Chief of State" as applied to our Chief Executive (of a tripartite, theoretically balanced, Government), and the President is not averse to using the term himself. He probably would not do so if he were well advised, and if he were not so worried.

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ON CAPITOL HILL: The mood of the President, as pictured above, is to some extent influenced by sounds and murmurs from Capitol Hill. If there were no foreign danger, the President might still be happy, as he has reason to be over the domestic situation. Any possible business recession seems many months in the future; and if it should develop by summer, there would always be the sovereign remedy of "spending", to ensure victory in the fall elections. But events bearing on our security have stirred up far more unrest on the Hill than has crept into public statements from legislators or in press accounts.

It is no exaggeration to say that Congress has been profoundly disturbed by (1) the Acheson statement on the Hiss case and (2) the revelations about Dr. Fuchs. After the first episode, not only Republicans but numerous Democrats were intensely critical of the Secretary of State. The Democrats said little in public, but their remarks in private must have been the cause of much worry when conveyed to the White House. Not only the patriotic Southern Democrats friendly to the Administration, but also old party hacks always subservient to the will of the Executive, were strongly opposed to the stand of the Secretary of State. There has been wide speculation as to the motives which inspired Acheson in this matter; Republicans, it should be reported, have imputed some rather ugly ones to Mr. Acheson. And the opinion that Acheson should resign has been widespread, among members of both the Democratic and Republican parties.

The speech of Senator McMahon was a symptom of the smoldering Congressional unrest -- which has ranged from vague uneasiness to brooding fear. If the Connecticut Senator had limited himself to an eloquent plea for attempting some new, but un-

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defined, approach to the international atomic problem (as did Vandenberg), he might have made a lasting impression. But his preposterous proposal for "buying" atom peace discredited the effort. As the Washington Daily News said: "That's like a guy with a gun meeting a guy without a gun and saying, 'I'll give you $5.00 if you let me throw away my gun'." Or, as some put it, "a new Danegeld". Many Senators wrote off the McMahon utterance as "election politics". Others remarked that this speech bore a strange similarity to some proposals in the Daily Worker. Then came the Fuchs arrest which revealed that the "guy without the gun" now actually has the "gun", and we allowed the "gun" to be given to him.

While most Members of Congress are rubbing their eyes and discovering "facts of life" hitherto unheeded, there is little evidence that they fully realize the significance of many developments which appear to be "political", but are actually "military". International Kremlin espionage is now becoming a reality to them -- no longer "weird tales" out of E. Phillips Oppenheim -- but superficially political moves remain veiled. Thus, few recognize for what it is the current drive by the Left on J. Edgar Hoover. This is a "military" move by the Communists, their followers and dupes, to hamper wire-tapping. That practice in general is indeed objectionable. But it is one of the FBI's best instruments for watching the fifth column. Also, although Congressman Gwinn described it correctly last summer, most people think of the Peekskill riot as either just a local disturbance or a test of civil liberty. Actually it was, as Gwinn pointed out, a military maneuver by military cadres of the Kremlin on our soil. And so on. Until public leaders clearly perceive all the implications of the Muscovite "cold war", the current muddle will continue.

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REPUBLICAN PLATFORM: The new Republican statement of policy, released on Monday, February 6, is a disappointing document. True, it rises somewhat above the very low level anticipated several weeks ago. Some of the electric atmosphere of these days has apparently charged a few passages with sparks of vigor. But the framers have failed to capitalize on strong, or potentially strong, currents of popular reaction to their political adversary. One feels that there should have been sufficient latitude, even within the Procrustean bed of intra-party politics, to produce an inspiring statement. Granted that, in an off-year Congressional election, principles had to be stretched to obtain wide approval among House and Senate members -- still the framers (or rather their leaders on Capitol Hill) missed the boat.

For instance, it would seem that, in face of a popular revulsion against taxes, a more radical and forthright stand could have been taken on this issue. Also, the bipartisan foreign policy is a veritable corpse, unless the political adversary chooses to seduce foolish Republicans by recalling it to life (not an unlikely possibility). Yet the phrase-makers "rabbited" ignominiously on this all important point. The worst deficiency was the failure to exploit recent events which have been crashing on the Administration's head -- the conviction of Hiss, the Acheson stand on that matter, the atomic crisis, the Fuchs case. It is known that various members of the Congressional delegation wanted to spearhead the statement with these events as a basis, in a slashing attack on the failures of the Democratic Administration. They were blocked. And a golden opportunity passed.

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PENTAGON ATTITUDE: In this crisis, it is well to report what some of the Pentagon men are saying. The problem of maintaining "secrecy", they claim, has been confused and misrepresented. It has been impossible or -- if possible -- unwise, to impose secrecy in atomic matters on the plane of theoretical physics and chemistry, for reasons often stated. However, these sources remind us, there is a lower plane, one on which formulae are concretely applied to materials which should have been,

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and should in the future be, carefully guarded. It is in this field that criminal leaks have occurred and henceforth this area of atomic endeavor should be shrouded in secrecy, no matter how the "liberal" columnists rave and roar. In short, what we have unpardonably let slip from our files has been "blueprints" and "know-how", the things Soviet Russia has traditionally lacked. This was the lesson of General Groves' statement that the Fuchs leak enabled Soviet Russia to gain at least a year in the fabrication of the A-bomb.

But there are other weapons than atomic bombs. The military men now claim that there was a striking leak which has given Soviet Russia a precious advantage. One of the best devices first manufactured by the U.S. in the last war was the "proximity fuse", for anti-aircraft shells. Before the end of the war, we let the British have it. After the war, they passed it on to Swedish interests which in turn sold it to Soviet Russia. There's another cause for concern: According to these military sources, a high-level Anglo-American military conference has been going on unnoticed in Washington for some weeks. It was called to arrange for exchange of industrial military intelligence between the armed forces of Britain and the U.S. Our sources fear that this meeting may result in an agreement dangerous to our military armory. As was illustrated in the Fuchs case, the U.S. has no control over the security imposed by other nations, however friendly they may be.

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ELECTORAL REFORM: The Lodge-Gossett amendment to reform the Presidential electoral system has stirred much discussion, some of it rather tiresome, among observers here. A few, but very few, object to the proposed changes on the ground that these would tend to break down state barriers and speed the trend towards Federal centralization; but even among States' Rights supporters there is no agreement on that point. Since the amendment must now face the House, there will undoubtedly be additional arguments, pro and con. In the New York Times, February 5, there is a letter written by Dr. Edward S. Corwin, Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus, at Princeton. One of the outstanding authorities on constitutional law, Corwin is at present working on a new edition of the Constitution, annotated, for the Library of Congress.

Corwin examines particularly the provisions of the Lodge-Gossett measures which (1) introduce the proportional representation principle into the system, and (2) the possibility of "plurality Presidents". "It is my own belief," says Corwin, "regarding reform of the electoral system, first that ridiculous as it is in some aspects, the Electoral College, so-called, should be retained, but that its members should be chosen in districts to be laid out by Congress every ten years." He remarks that "if we are to believe Madison" this was the system which the Framers of the Constitution had in mind. Next, "the requirement that the President receive a majority of electoral votes should be retained"; and finally, "when any candidate fails to receive such a majority, the House of Representatives should choose as at present, except for the important change that it vote per capita and not per state."

Corwin explains: "A President thus chosen would come near at least to being the people's choice and, moreover, would probably be guaranteed at the outset of his term a House of the same political complexion as himself. Presidential influence has become the most prominent, the most dominant, element of our constitutional system, and this fact of itself forbids the idea of our instituting a system of Presidential election which might make plurality Presidents the rule rather than the exception. It also forbids the idea of supplanting geographical parties with pressure-group parties which a President can at any time wheel into action to do battle for his pet schemes provided he concedes them theirs. The proposal is careless of both these dangers."

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Book Events

The German Catastrophe, by Friedrich Meinecke; translated by Sidney B. Fay. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. $3.00. Reviewed by J. M. Lalley.

Professor Meinecke, the celebrated historian who is now in his eighty-seventh year, has lived through the whole history of the German Reich. In this essay, evidently written in the earlier phase of the Occupation, he gives his personal testimony and his professional analysis of the factors that prepared for the final destruction under Hitler of all that had been accomplished under Bismarck. The burden of the testimony is that the historical tendencies apparent in Germany throughout the last 60 or 70 years must be considered as an intensification and acceleration of forces that were everywhere active in Europe. They were part of "the general fermentation in a monstrous process, whether of the decline or of the transformation of the West into new forms of life". In the demoniacal personality of Hitler all the psychological traits generally characteristic of modern mankind were combined and energized into violence. This, however, is not a plea in extenuation; what Professor Meinecke wishes to show is why so large a proportion of Germans were predisposed to embrace Naziism long before it had made its historical appearance.

Professor Meinecke finds that the two most powerful forces of the epoch covered by the rise and disappearance of Germany as a Great Power have been nationalism and Socialism. For long these forces were outwardly antagonistic; nationalism, gradually evolving into an aggressive imperialism, was the cult of the triumphant bourgeoisie; Socialism, representing the material aspiration of the workers, proclaimed its international affinities and allegiances. But both forces were the results of the same social pressures arising from the vast and unexampled increases of population after the industrial revolutions. Each in its way marked a departure from the European tradition, that is to say from Occidental Christianity and from the humanistic and liberal ethos that Professor Meinecke considers to have been the secular projection of the Christian spirit. Each asserted the priority of the collectivity, that is of nation or class, over the person and over the individual conscience. Each found the traditional ethical norms of Western civilization incompatible with its ambitions. Meanwhile the new values of life had produced a radical alteration in the character of European education. With the elaboration of technologies and the rise of the managerial middle class came the emphasis upon specialization and the ascendancy, as Professor Meinecke puts it, of homo faber over homo sapiens. The harmony between the rational and the affective elements in the human spirit which had been the purpose of the old-fashioned liberal studies was now disrupted. As the social power and prestige of the technician grew, so did his influence in the political order, where his disposition was to apply the concepts of engineering to political problems and to envisage the flesh-and-blood units of the social organism in the light of plastic materials capable of being reorganized according to blueprint specifications.

Adolf Hitler had an intuitive understanding of these forces and his propaganda sought to fuse them into a new and anti-Christian Weltanschauung, or cosmic vision. He was thus able to bribe each powerful element of German Society that had been affected by these influences into an acceptance of his Police State, by promising to each the fulfillment of its special ambition. When the Germans discovered that Hitler himself had no real purpose beyond that of power for its own sake, that both nationalism and Socialism were merely instruments to his end, to be abandoned whenever expediency might require, it was too late to repair the mistake. They had bound themselves to a regime of "criminals and fools", from which nothing but national catastrophe could deliver them.

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European Supplement *to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 6

By Marion Doenhoff HAMBURG -- January, 1950

THE STORY OF THE SAAR: Soviet Germany and Western Germany, which are not on speaking terms, have only one thing in common. They do not associate or, rather, they are not allowed to associate with the third Germany -- the Saar territory -- which has evolved from the rubble of the former Reich.

The Saar problem, the most controversial of all in Western Europe now, has once again revealed the hectic mood of our times. Mistrust and misunderstanding are the real impulses of present-day life. Our actions are not rooted in progressive and positive inspirations; we do not combine with the contented feeling of a common communion. We form our groupings because we are afraid, or because we feel the need to protect ourselves. And this is precisely why any careless move or remark on one side immediately meets with violent reaction from the other.

Chancellor Adenauer, in his first important interview on foreign affairs, which he gave to Die Zeit on November 3, 1949, stated: "I think it is very unfortunate that the question of the Saar has been linked with the question of European Union." It would be unwise, he said, if either France or Germany made their membership in the Council of Europe dependent upon certain conditions. The final clarification of the Saar question must come in a treaty of peace with Germany.

In an interview given to the same Hamburg paper on December 22, French Foreign Minister Schuman said of the Saar: "According to international law a final decision can only be reached through a peace treaty, which takes into consideration the interests and the will of the affected population."

How, then, was it possible, that with such good will and so many good intentions, the raising of the Saar question should suddenly prove so explosive? Two things happened. The rumor spread that it was intended to lease the Saar mines to France for a period of 50 years. And President Heuss made a speech in which he said that the Saar was ethnically and historically German territory, a fact which the French themselves have never disputed.

Nevertheless, in France, and subsequently in the rest of the world, a storm of indignation broke loose over this display of "German nationalism". Throughout Germany, on the other hand, there was deep disappointment, illustrated by the expression: "The vanquished are always wrong." Even the most reasonable and moderate Germans declared that the proposed Saar-mine contract would be a betrayal, since it would necessarily prejudice any peace treaty so far as this issue is concerned.

The German attitude can only be understood if one recalls the post-war development which has taken place in the Saar territory. As is known, the Saar belonged to the French zone of occupation. As early as 1945 the French started a movement which was at first called "mouvement pour la liberation" and later became the "mouvement pour le rattachement de la Saare à la France" (called MRS). In the winter of 1945-46 this movement started local committees, and later, when political parties were reformed, these committees succeeded in directing them into a pro-French course.

It was obvious that the officials of French Military Government, who were responsible for censoring press and radio, and, most of all, the "Sureté", which exercised a strict control, had great influence on this political development in the Saar. Expatriation was not only threatened, but was actually carried out, in the case of 1500 Saarlanders who had shown lack of enthusiasm for the MRS. The slogan was: Saarlanders, do you want to stay with the Germany of dismantling and repara-

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tions? Do you want your heavy industry closed down? Do you want to starve? Or do you want to become an autonomous State linked economically with prosperous France?

A memorandum of the U.S. Department of State on "The Present Status of the Saar" (October, 1948), says:

> "Until the middle of 1946, the Social Democratic Party in the Saar followed its German leadership at Hannover in withholding support, together with a considerable group within the local Christian People's Party, for the aims of France in the Saar. But well-supplied with funds, profiting from its head start in organizing activities, and benefiting from the belief current among the population that its adherents stand well in the opinion of the occupying power, the Mouvement pour le Rattachement de la Saare soon succeeded in gaining control of the political life of the Saarland. Its members and sympathizers to a telling degree now shape the policies of the major Saar parties, accommodating the advanced views of the MRS to the more passive sentiment of the population by pointing the parties toward the more limited goal of political autonomy and economic integration with France".

Even before the Moscow Conference, at which the peace treaty was to have been drafted, 1200 French customs officers suddenly appeared in the Saar and on December 22, 1946, set up a customs frontier between this part of Germany and the rest. The French Foreign Office declared that this action should not be regarded as a unilateral measure, nor as anticipating the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was merely a matter of security. The annexation was not sanctioned at Moscow. However, in June, 1947, the new Saar-mark was introduced and, after the election, was followed in November by the French franc, which became the legal currency. A year earlier, on June 8, 1946, France had moved the Saar frontier towards Trier, thus enlarging the Saar territory by nearly one third (from 1912 to 2576 square kilometers). For none of these actions was there any legal authority.

Finally, it was decided to create the legal basis for an autonomous Saar State. A drafting committee of 20, instituted under French supervision and consisting mostly of members of the MRS, was set up to prepare the constitution. A motion calling for a plebiscite on this constitution was rejected. Instead, the organic law was to be approved by the Saar Assembly, when elected.

The text of the constitution, however, was kept secret prior to this election. In the preamble, the separation of the Saar from Germany and its incorporation with France were stipulated. Papers which attempted to publish the text had it obliterated by the censor. During the election campaign any mention of the real issue of Saar sovereignty was prohibited and public discussion was confined to such matters as economic organization and education. Thus the population was kept in the dark about the importance of the voting. This is confirmed by the American memorandum.

On December 31, 1947, powers of control over the Saar territory were transferred from the French Military Government to the High Commissioner and by the end of March, 1948, the Saar had been definitely integrated into the French economy.

What is discussed today is the definitive nature of Saar "autonomy". It is scarcely surprising that, in the light of their previous experiences, the Germans are worried. At Versailles, in 1920, President Wilson successfully opposed Clemenceau's wish for annexation of the Saar. But times have changed and with them moral principles, despite the ideals set forth in the Atlantic Charter. It is perhaps understandable that, in the matter of annexation, many Germans can see no difference between the policy of Soviet Russia and that of the Western Allies.

One hope still remains. It is that some day there will be a free Western European Union, in which national frontiers and distinctions between victor and vanquished will no longer count. But we are still a long way from this goal. Much patience, trust and goodwill are needed on every side, if it is to be attained.

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AN X-RAY OF GERMAN THOUGHT: The results of a voluminous and very interesting poll conducted by the "Institut für Demoskopie" has just been published here. It is along the general lines of the Gallup Poll, but with minute and German thoroughness. A carefully chosen "sample" of 2000 people, representative of West German population groups in their social standing, income, political opinion, age and other characteristics, were questioned by 400 trained reporters. This was not done by written questionnaires, but in detailed interviews so that the questions posed were not answered merely "yes" or "no", but with individual commentaries.

The Institute has proceeded from a realization that the elections to the new Federal Parliament last summer do not give a true idea of post-war political opinion in Germany. The mere division of votes among various parties with vague programs, promoted by demagogic propaganda, cannot be expected to present a correct picture.

Of those interrogated, 20 per cent said they had not participated in the Parliamentary elections last August. This figure itself indicates the accuracy of the sampling method, since actually 21 per cent of the electorate failed to vote. Asked why, those who were qualified but did not vote gave the following reasons:

1.	Lack of political interest	41 per cent
2.	Inability for personal reasons	34 per cent
3.	Mistrust of all party programs	23 per cent
4.	Will not vote under foreign rule	2 per cent

The largest contingent of non-voters is found among those with a monthly income of less than 50 Marks, approximately $12.00 at present exchange, and also among women and those under thirty years of age. All the answers, including those which have nothing to do with politics, illustrate the pronounced inertia of non-voters. On the whole, however, it is evident that faith in representative government has been stimulated and confirmed by a restoration of a certain amount of independence and freedom of action under the West German Federal State.

Questioned as to their confidence in the various political parties, on the basis of actual accomplishment, 51 per cent indicated disillusionment and only 13 per cent satisfaction. For future prospects in the field of political activity 47 per cent were optimistic and 25 per cent were pessimistic. Confidence in the parties and in political action in Germany is greater among men than among women, who tend to react pessimistically to all questions. There is also more confidence in political action among older people than with those under thirty years of age.

As a test of national vitality it was asked: "Do you believe that Germany still has a political future?" To this 61 per cent replied "yes"; 17 per cent "no". "Certainly not for the next century", a farmer answered. "We have been sold to four masters", replied an elderly invalid woman. Comments of those who see no hope for Germany's political future are usually much more bitter than those who are optimistic. But if one considers the present economic condition of Germany, and what every individual has lost and suffered, 17 per cent of cynicism is not very disturbing.

Some of the questions required not so much a political as a personal confession of faith. Among these is the following: "Do you think it more advisable for Germans themselves to try to create a peaceful understanding with other peoples, or should we leave all the initiative in this field to others?" The division on this:

1.	For a German initiative	64 per cent
2.	For foreign initiative	10 per cent
3.	For a collaborative approach	3 per cent
4.	For delay in this matter	14 per cent
5.	Undecided	9 per cent

The overwhelming majority for a German initiative in better international understanding is both closely reasoned and in some cases expressed in very simple terms. A farm worker says: "Other peoples ought to see that we are fed up with

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war." A mechanic says: "We are to blame for the war and so have responsibility to get things straight again." An unemployed dressmaker replies: "If we rely entirely on others, we are lost from now on."

The general faith in the political state of Germany is not balanced by any optimism in respect to our economic possibilities. It was asked: "Do you think it possible to have a world-wide economic situation, including Germany, in which everybody, including the 'have nots', can make a decent living?" To this question only 31 per cent answered "yes"; 38 per cent thought this outcome completely unobtainable and 23 per cent thought it might be possible. The negative replies show a very definite rejection of all revolutionary and reformist illusions, indicating a clean break with the naivete of public opinion in the past. It is astonishing that the Marxist parties, which two decades ago would have answered this question overwhelmingly in the affirmative, are now very skeptical. Of the Socialists questioned, 28 per cent, and of the Communists 19 per cent, answered "no".

One question was designed to ascertain who wants Free Enterprise. It was: "Do you think that a fair economic condition could be established by redistribution of the present national income, or do you think it essential to increase this income?" The replies to this question are the more surprising considering the high proportion of completely expropriated refugees; 20 per cent consider a fair distribution unobtainable; 22 per cent are in favor of redistribution, but 43 per cent emphasize the importance of increasing the national income. Here again it is noteworthy that 34 per cent of the Socialists queried, and 35 per cent of the Communists, regard increased production as more important than redistribution. In other words, class war ideology is now practically non-existent in Germany. Perhaps the explanation lies in the universal condition of need and the destruction of private capital. Here there are really only two classes, replacing all former social divisions. There are those who have employment; and those who are unemployed, including refugees who in particular have been unable to find work in the Western zones.

It is also apparent, from the results of this inquiry, that mistrust of official assurances now plays a very large role in Germany, not only towards the occupying Powers, but also towards German leadership. There is fear that the State, formerly the god of the German people, might again acquire all too much power. But only 23 per cent of those questioned answered "yes" when they were asked whether they thought it would be advantageous to have the strengthening of governmental powers which would necessarily follow nationalization of industry.

There are practically only two questions on which everybody agrees, whether wage earners, civil servants or professional workers, irrespective of income or age. One of these questions is whether international co-operation is now desirable for Germany. If there is a single tendency which, as probably never before, has now the opportunity of becoming universally popular, it is the longing for European, and after that, for world-wide co-operation. The second point of universal agreement is found in the desire for domestic unity. Here everybody emphasizes the same objectives: the reconstruction of the bomb-damaged homeland and the improvement of living conditions.

From the reading of all these individual statements, one thing stands out. The desire for peace which runs like a guiding thread through all the expressions of opinion. The reasoning is very practical and unsentimental. It is not like the pacifism of the 20's, which had a strong literary manifestation, but rather the definite practical realization of a people that war never brings them profit. The following impression stands out: as a whole, the German people still possess astonishing vitality; they are skeptical towards all slogans and all manifestations of power politics. They are fed up both with isolationism and with domestic party politics, and they are longing for peace and co-operative effort with their fellow men. In a word, the Germans have learned a great deal from the Hitler Period.

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